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A MATHEMATICAL COMMITMENT WITHOUT
COMPUTATIONAL STRENGTH
ANTON FREUND
Abstract. We present a new manifestation of Go¨del’s second incomplete-
ness theorem and discuss its foundational significance, in particular with re-
spect to Hilbert’s program. Specifically, we consider a proper extension of
Peano arithmetic (PA) by a mathematically meaningful axiom scheme that
consists of Σ0
2
-sentences. These sentences assert that each computably enu-
merable (Σ0
1
-definable without parameters) property of finite binary trees has
a finite basis. Since this fact entails the existence of polynomial time al-
gorithms, it is important for computer science. On a technical level, our ax-
iom scheme is a variant of an independence result due to Harvey Friedman. At
the same time, the meta-mathematical properties of our axiom scheme distin-
guish it from most known independence results: Due to its logical complexity,
our axiom scheme does not add computational strength. The only known
method to establish its independence relies on Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem. In contrast, Go¨del’s theorem is not needed for typical examples of
Π0
2
-independence (such as the Paris-Harrington principle), since computational
strength provides an extensional invariant on the level of Π0
2
-sentences.
1. Summary of mathematical results
This paper consists of mathematical results and a foundational discussion. The
former are summarized in the present section; the latter can be found in Section 2.
In the remaining sections we provide detailed proofs of all mathematical claims.
First and foremost, our paper is based on a result by Dick de Jongh (unpublished;
cf. the introduction to [34]) and Diana Schmidt [35]: The embeddability relation on
finite binary trees yields a well partial order with maximal order type ε0 (see below
for an explanation). Harvey Friedman [37] has show that this type of result yields
statements of finite combinatorics that are independent of important mathematical
axiom systems. Against this background, many arguments in the present paper
may be considered folklore. Nevertheless we find it worthwhile to give an explicit
presentation, not least because the arguments are rather sensitive with respect to
quantifier complexity and the presence of parameters. At some places we provide
more details than the expert may find necessary. The aim is to make the paper as
accessible and self-contained as possible.
We write B for the set of finite binary trees. More precisely, we assume that each
tree has a distinguished root node, that nodes have either zero or two children, and
that left and right child can be distinguished. Furthermore, we identify isomorphic
trees. Formally, we view B as the least fixed point of the following inductive clauses:
(i) There is an element ◦ ∈ B (the tree that consists of a single root node).
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(ii) Given s and t in B, we obtain an element ◦(s, t) ∈ B (the tree in which the
root has left subtree s and right subtree t).
For s, t ∈ B we write s ≤B t if there is a tree embedding of s into t. Such an
embedding can either map the root to the root and the immediate subtrees of s
into the corresponding subtrees of t; or it maps all of s into one subtree of t. Hence
we have ◦ ≤B t for any t ∈ B; we have s ≤B ◦ precisely for s = ◦; and we have
◦(s0, s1) ≤B ◦(t0, t1) ⇔
{
s0 ≤B t0 and s1 ≤B t1,
or ◦ (s0, s1) ≤B ti for some i ∈ {0, 1}.
These clauses provide a recursive definition of ≤B.
Recall that a partial order consists of a set X and a binary relation ≤X onX that
is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. A finite or infinite sequence x0, x1, . . .
in X is called good if there are indices i < j such that we have xi ≤X xj ; otherwise,
the sequence is called bad. If there is no infinite bad sequence, then (X,≤X) is
called a well partial order (wpo). Equivalently, a partial order (X,≤X) is a wpo
if, and only if, every subset Y ⊆ X has a finite “basis” a ⊆ Y with the following
property: for any y ∈ Y there is an x ∈ a with x ≤X y (cf. the argument in
Remark 3.1 below).
If X is a wpo, then all its linearizations are well orders (since a strictly decreasing
sequence in a linearization would be a bad sequence in X). Hence the order type of
each linearization is an ordinal number. The supremum of these ordinals is called
the maximal order type of X . As shown by D. de Jongh and R. Parikh [22], the
maximal order type of any wpo is realized by one of its linearizations (i. e. the
supremum is a maximum).
Kruskal’s theorem [27] implies that (B,≤B) is a well partial order. We point out
that the theorem applies to arbitrary (i. e. not necessarily binary) finite trees; the
“most general” version of Kruskal’s theorem is investigated in [12]. Concerning the
binary case, de Jongh and Schmidt have proved the finer result that B has maximal
order type ε0, which is the least fixed point of ordinal exponentiation with base ω
(read [35, Theorem II.2] in combination with the example after [35, Definition I.15]).
A classical result of G. Gentzen [16, 17] establishes ε0 as the proof theoretic ordinal
of Peano arithmetic (PA). This explains the connection with independence results.
In the present paper we consider the binary Kruskal theorem in the context of
first order arithmetic; an introdution to this setting can be found in [18]. We will be
particularly interested in questions of quantifier complexity: Recall that a formula
lies in the class ∆00 = Σ
0
0 = Π
0
0 if it does only contain bounded quantifiers. Since
the latter range over a finite domain, the truth of closed ∆00-formulas is uniformly
decidable. A Σ0n+1-formula (Π
0
n+1-formula) has the form ∃xϕ (the form ∀xϕ),
where ϕ is a Π0n-formula (Σ
0
n-formula). Recall that the Σ
0
1-formulas correspond
to the computably enumerable relations. A relation is ∆01-definable (in PA) if it
has a Σ01-definition and a Π
0
1-definition (which PA proves to be equivalent). The
∆01-relations coincide with the decidable ones.
Working in PA, the elements of B can be represented by numerical codes for
finite sets of sequences with entries from {0, 1}. Note that the relations s ∈ B and
s ≤B t are ∆
0
1-definable in PA. As mentioned above, the fact that B is a wpo can
be expressed in terms of a finite basis property. To state the latter we abbreviate
∃fina ψ(a) :≡ ∃a(“a ∈ N codes a finite set” ∧ ψ(a)).
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In the context of PA it is natural to focus on definable sets. Given a formula ϕ(s)
with a distinguished free variable, the finite basis property for {s ∈ B |ϕ(s)} ⊆ B
can be formalized as
Kϕ :≡ ∃fina⊆B(∀s∈aϕ(s) ∧ ∀t∈B(ϕ(t)→ ∃s∈as ≤B t)).
Note that the quantifiers with subscript s ∈ a are bounded, since a is a code for a
finite set (cf. [18, Lemma I.1.32]); in contrast, the quantifiers with subscripts a ⊆ B
and t ∈ B are unbounded. The symbol K alludes to Kruskal’s theorem, which
implies that all instances Kϕ are true (see Remark 3.1 for details). We will be most
interested in the axiom scheme
KΣ−1 := {Kϕ | “ϕ a Σ
0
1-formula with exactly one free variable”}.
The superscript of Σ−1 emphasizes the fact that no further free variables are allowed.
This ensures that each instance of KΣ−1 is a closed Σ
0
2-formula.
To motivate the restrictions on the quantifier complexity and the parameters,
we recall the notion of computational strength: A computable function f : N→ N
is provably total in a suitable theory T if the latter proves ∀x∃!yϕ(x, y) for some
Σ01-definition ϕ of the graph of f (where ∃! abbreviates the existence of a unique
witness). The computational strength of a theory is commonly identified with the
collection of its provably total computable functions.
It is known that the computational strength of a theory does not increase when
we add a true Π01-sentence ψ as an axiom. Essentially, this is due to the fact that the
Σ01-formula ψ → ϕ(x, y) defines the same graph as ϕ(x, y) (note that the definition
of provably total function is extensional). A simple but fundamental observation
shows that the same is true for closed Σ02-axioms: It suffices to note that any true
Σ02-sentence ∃xψ(x) follows from some true Π
0
1-instance ψ(n) (see Proposition 3.2
for details). Note that we may not be able to compute the correct witness n ∈ N;
this issue will resurface at the end of the present section.
The general facts from the previous paragraph imply that PA + KΣ−1 has the
same computational strength as PA. At this point it is crucial that we exclude
parameters: If the Σ01-formula ϕ contains further free variables, then the universal
closure of Kϕ is a Π03-formula, so that our argument does no longer apply. Note
that the version with parameters can be expressed by a single Π03-sentence (rather
than a scheme), due to the existence of a universal computably enumerable set.
Next, we explain why PA+KΣ−1 is a proper extension of PA. Based on a nota-
tion system for the ordinal ε0 (see Section 4 for details), transfinite induction can
be expressed in first order arithmetic: Given a formula ψ(α) with a distinguished
free variable, we set
T I(ε0, ψ) :≡ ∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β)→ ψ(γ))→ ∀α≺ε0ψ(α).
The scheme of parameter-free Π01-induction up to ε0 is the collection
T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) := {T I(ε0, ψ) | “ψ a Π
0
1-formula with exactly one free variable”}.
In Section 4 we show that each instance of T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) can be proved in PA+KΣ
−
1 .
This is a straightforward consequence of the fact that ε0 is bounded by (and in fact
equal to) the maximal order type of B. Nevertheless we find it worthwhile to
give a detailed proof, which pays attention to the quantifier complexities and the
role of parameters. Gentzen [16] has used Π01-induction up to ε0 to establish the
consistency of PA. This induction does not require parameters, as we will check in
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Section 5. Hence the consistency of PA can be proved in PA + KΣ−1 . The latter
must thus be a proper extension, due to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
In Section 6 we review the proof that B has maximal order type ε0. Based on this
fact, we can also show that each instance ofKΣ−1 is provable inPA+T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ). To
complete the picture, we relate transfinite induction and reflection. Let PrPA(ϕ) be
a standard formalization of the statement that the formula with code ϕ is provable
in PA (see [18, Section I.4(a)]; we will also write ϕ for pϕq). Given a sentence ϕ
of first order arithmetic, we put
RfnPA(ϕ) :≡ PrPA(ϕ)→ ϕ.
The local (i. e. parameter-free) Σ02-reflection principle over PA is the collection
RfnPA(Σ
0
2) :≡ {RfnPA(ϕ) | “ϕ a closed Σ
0
2-formula”}.
Due to G. Kreisel and A. Le´vy [26], uniform reflection over PA is equivalent to
ε0-induction for formulas with parameters. We will show that the proof can be
adapted to the parameter free case. This results in Theorem 7.3, which asserts
PA+KΣ−1 ≡ PA+ T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) ≡ PA+RfnPA(Σ
0
2).
In view of Goryachev’s theorem, we can conclude the following (see Corollary 7.4):
Over Peano arithmetic, the Π01-consequences of KΣ
−
1 are precisely those of the fi-
nitely iterated consistency statements for PA. Due to another result of Kreisel and
Le´vy [26], we can also deduce that PA+KΣ−1 is not contained in any consistent ex-
tension of PA by a computably enumerable set of Π02-sentences (see Corollary 5.2).
Acknowledgements. I am very grateful to Lev Beklemishev for our inspiring discus-
sions and his helpful comments on a first version of this paper.
2. Foundational considerations
In the previous section we have presented an extension of Peano arithmetic by
an axiom scheme KΣ−1 that is related to Kruskal’s theorem. The present section is
concerned with the foundational significance of this extension.
Let us first recall some aspects of Hilbert’s program; for a more thorough discus-
sion and further references we refer to the introduction by R. Zach [47]. To secure
the abstract methods that are central to modern mathematics, Hilbert wanted to
justify them by finitist reasoning about natural numbers, which he views as “extra-
logical concrete objects that are intuitively present as immediate experience prior
to all throught” [20, p. 171]. (All quotations from [20, 21] are translated as in [46].)
The status of the natural numbers entails that certain statements about them are
finitistically meaningful. This includes, first of all, statements which assert that a
given tuple of numbers satisfies some primitive recursive relation. Such a statement
can be verified explicitly, which explains its priviledged role, but also entails—as
Hilbert [20, p. 165] puts it—that it is “of no essential interest when considered by
itself”. In addition, one admits universal statements with verifiable instances. Ac-
cording to Hilbert [20, p. 173], such a statement can be accepted as “a hypothetical
judgement that comes to assert something when a numeral is given”. In contrast,
unbounded existential statements are not seen as finitistically meaningful, as “one
cannot [. . . ] try out all numbers” [21, p. 73]. At the same time, Hilbert [21, p. 77f]
emphasizes the fact that existential statements play an extremely fruitful role in
abstract mathematics. One could even be tempted to say that abstract notions
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acquire meaning through their role in the mathematical development, a position
that seems to resonate with the following statement by Hilbert [21, p. 79]:
“To make it a universal requirement that each individual formula
[. . . ] be interpretable by itself is by no means reasonable; on the
contrary, a theory by its very nature is such that we do not need to
fall back upon intuition or meaning in the midst of some argument.”
However, such a conception of meaning is very different from the finitist one.
The extent of finitist reasoning is commonly identified with primitive recursive
arithmetic (PRA). This identification has been justified by W. Tait [42]; in [43]
he lists and refutes some objections. A quantifier-free formulation seems to be
most appropriate: In a such a setting, one can only express statements that are
finistically meaningful; universal statements correspond to open formulas. To make
our considerations as accessible as possible, we will, nevertheless, work in the usual
framework of first order arithmetic with quantifiers. Following C. Smorynski [40],
we agree to identify the finitistically meaningful statements with the Π01-sentences.
More specifically, then, Hilbert’s program suggested to formalize all of abstract
mathematics as an axiom system T. In order to obtain a finitist justification,
one was supposed to prove the consistency of T in the theory PRA. At this
point it is important to note that consistency is not merely a minimal requirement:
If the consistency of a theory T is provable in PRA, then the latter proves all
Π01-theorems of T, i. e. all results that are finitistically meaningful (see [21, p. 78f]).
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems show that Hilbert’s program cannot be carried
out: It is impossible for T to prove its own consistency; a fortiori, the consistency
of T cannot be established in the weaker theory PRA.
Despite Go¨del’s theorems, the aims of Hilbert’s program have been achieved to
an astonishing extent: A substantial part of contemporary mathematics can indeed
be formalized in rather weak axiom systems (see e. g. the work of S. Feferman [8],
as well as U. Kohlenbach’s proof mining program [23]). In view of these positive
results, it is all the more intriguing to ask: Are there natural mathematical theorems
that can be expressed but not proved inPRA, or in some stronger theory? To count
as a natural theorem, the unprovable statement should arise from mathematical
practice; it should not involve the logical notions of proof or model. In particular,
consistency statements (which are unprovable by Go¨del’s theorem) are not seen as
examples of this type.
We do have good examples of true Π02-statements that are unprovable in relevant
axiom systems: The Paris-Harrington principle cannot be proved in Peano arith-
metic [30]; Friedman’s miniaturization of Kruskal’s theorem is independent of an
even stronger system [37], which is associated with predicative mathematics. The
situation is less satisfactory when it comes to Π01-sentences, which are most import-
ant from the finitist viewpoint: The independent statement due to S. Shelah [36]
involves notions from model theory, so that its status as a natural mathematical
theorem can be questioned. Friedman has presented work on Π01-independence from
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (see e. g. [13]), but his results are not yet published in
final form. In our opinion, the search for mathematical Π01-sentences that are inde-
pendent of relevant axiom systems remains one of the most interesting challenges
in mathematical logic.
The axiom scheme KΣ−1 from the previous section does not settle the challenge
of natural Π01-independence. The latter can, nevertheless, serve as a benchmark
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that helps us to assess the foundational significance of KΣ−1 . In the rest of this
section we carry out such an assessment.
First, we will argue that KΣ−1 is a natural mathematical commitment. In the
previous section we have seen that KΣ−1 is a restricted version of Kruskal’s theorem.
The latter is firmly established as a natural result of mathematical practice. Hence
it remains to argue that the restrictions that lead to KΣ−1 are natural as well.
In formulating KΣ−1 , we have restricted Kruskal’s theorem in two ways: Firstly,
we have decided to work with binary rather than arbitrary finite trees. This restric-
tion makes it easier to determine the precise strength of KΣ−1 (i. e. to prove the equi-
valence with transfinite induction and local reflection), but it is not essential: If we
extend our axiom scheme to arbitrary finite trees, then it will imply the consistency
of stronger axiom systems; at the same time, it will still not increase the computa-
tional strength, since it also consists of Σ02-statements. The graph minor theorem
of N. Robertson and P. Seymour [33] suggests a very intriguing axiom scheme that
is even stronger (cf. [14]) but does not have computational strength either (for
the same general reason). In summary, the restriction to binary trees is purely
pragmatic and does not change the general foundational behaviour. Secondly, the
scheme KΣ−1 is a restriction of Kruskal’s theorem insofar as it demands a finite basis
for computably enumerable—rather than arbitrary—sets of trees. In the following
we give two justifications for the restriction to computably enumerable sets.
The first justification is that KΣ−1 suffices for certain applications in computer
science: Assume that P is an upwards closed property of finite binary trees, which
means that P (s) and s ≤B t imply P (t). Often (but not always, cf. [9, Theorem 3])
one will already know that P is decidable. Then P can be defined by a Σ01-formula,
and KΣ−1 yields a finite a ⊆ B such that P (t) is equivalent to ∃s∈as ≤B t. The
latter can be decided in polynomial time (in the size of t). The author knows of no
concrete applications in the context of trees, but the analogous argument for the
graph minor relation has many applications (see e. g. [10]).
The second justification for the restriction to computably enumerable sets is
based on the idea that one can have reasons to accept KΣ−1 but not the full Kruskal
theorem for binary trees. To make this plausible we recall that KΣ−1 is equivalent
to parameter-free Π01-induction up to ε0. The latter is no stronger than induction
for decidable (i. e. finitistically meaningful) properties, still up to ε0 (see e. g. [41,
Lemma 4.5]). From a finitist standpoint it makes sense to accept this induction
principle but not the second order statement that ε0 is well-founded, which would
be required for the binary Kruskal theorem. Indeed, Tait [43, p. 411] states that
Kreisel [24] accepts quantifier-free induction up to each ordinal below ε0 as finit-
ist. Also, G. Takeuti’s justification of transfinite induction is supposed to “involve
‘Gedankenexperimente’ [thought experiments] only on clearly defined operations
applied to some concretely given figures” [44, p. 97].
Next, we discuss the fact that KΣ−1 is a scheme rather than a single statement.
In the previous section we have explained that PA + KΣ−1 proves the consistency
of PA. Of course, this proof involves only finitely many instances Kϕ1, . . . ,Kϕn.
However, we see no basis for the claim that these particular instances constitute a
natural mathematical commitment—in contrast to the axiom scheme as a whole. In
this sense our reference to an axiom scheme is essential. What does this entail? We
think that the answer depends on our attitude towards independence phenomena.
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One possibility is to think of independent statements as “unsolvable conjectures”.
More explicitly, one might imagine a mathematician immersed in Peano arithmetic,
who is challenged to prove or refute the Paris-Harrington principle. The independ-
ence result tells us that this mathematician can never succeed. This conception
of independence is clearly concerned with single statements rather than schemes.
However, one can also think of independence in terms of “potential axioms”. For
example, one may view the principle of induction for arbitrary first order formulas
as a mathematical commitment beyond the finitist standpoint. This example shows
that schemes play a natural role within such a conception of independence.
A broad conception of independence may even incorporate rules, in addition to
axiom schemes. In the present context it is interesting to consider the rule
∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β)→ ψ(γ))
∀α≺ε0ψ(α)
of Π01-induction along ε0, which allows us to infer ∀α≺ε0ψ(α) once we have given
a proof of ∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β) → ψ(γ)), where ψ(α) can be any Π
0
1-formula without
further free variables. Note that the rule does not commit us to the contrapositive of
the corresponding axiom, i. e. to the least element principle. Hence the rule avoids
certain existential commitments, which is well motivated in a finitist context. As
shown by L. Beklemishev [3, Theorem 3], the closure of PA under the rule of
Π01-induction along ε0 proves the same theorems as the extension of PA by finitely
iterated consistency statements. Note that the rule does not refer to logical notions
such as proof or model. Insofar as induction up to ε0 is a result of mathematical
practice, we have a mathematical commitment on the level of Π01-statements.
Finally, we discuss the fact that KΣ−1 consists of Σ
0
2-statements rather than
Π01-statements. At the end of the previous section we have mentioned that there
is no computably enumerable set Ψ of Π01-sentences (or even Π
0
2-sentences) such
that PA + Ψ is consistent and contains PA + KΣ−1 . This shows that our use of
Σ02-sentences is essential in a rather strong sense.
As mentioned above, many of the known independence results for PA are con-
cerned with Π02-sentences. Extending Hilbert’s view on Π
0
1-sentences, one could
see Π02-sentences as “hypothetical judgement[s]” [20, p. 173] of complexity Σ
0
1.
This might suggest that Π02-sentences are less abstract—in the finitist sense—than
Σ02-statements. From this viewpoint, the independence of KΣ
−
1 would be less signi-
ficant than the known independence results. An argument that supports the signi-
ficance of Σ02-independence will be given below. First, we give another explanation
for the fact that Π02-independence is more prominent in the existing literature.
Gentzen’s ordinal analysis shows that each purported proof of a contradiction
can be reduced to a proof with smaller ordinal label. To establish consistency, one
can use this reduction in two different ways: In the present paper, we invoke induc-
tion on α ≺ ε0 to show that no proof with label α can produce a contradiction. This
avoids parameters but involves a universal quantification over proofs with given or-
dinal label; it leads to local Σ02-reflection, which has complexity Σ
0
2. Alternatively,
Gentzen’s reduction shows that a purported proof p of a contradiction leads to
a strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals, which is primitive recursive with para-
meter p. One can then invoke the primitive recursive well-foundedness of ε0. This
leads to uniform Σ01-reflection (see [15, Theorem 4.5]), which is a Π
0
2-statement. It
seems that the second approach is preferred in the finitist literature. For example,
Takeuti writes that the consistency proof is based on the following [44, p. 92]:
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“Whenever a concrete method of constructing decreasing sequences
of ordinals is given, any such decreasing sequence must be finite.”
This preference may help to explain the pre-eminence of Π02-independence. As an
exception, we mention that L. Beklemishev and A. Visser [2] have characterized
the Σ0n-consequences of PA (and of its fragments) in terms of iterated reflection.
Kreisel [25] has initiated work on finiteness theorems of complexity Σ02, but here
the focus is on proof-mining rather than independence.
The significance of Σ02-independence is related to the notions of provably total
function and computational strength, which we have recalled in the previous section.
An independent Π02-statement will typically add a provably total function: For the
Paris-Harrington principle this is the case by [30, Theorem 3.2]; the general claim
is plausible in view of [15, Theorems 2.24 and 4.5] and [39, Theorem 5]. In contrast,
we have seen that KΣ−1 does not increase the computational strength of PA.
The fact that KΣ−1 does not add provably total functions is interesting in its
own right, but it becomes even more relevant in view of the following: The notion
of computational strength is a relatively robust extensional invariant. Bounds on
provably total functions can be established without the use of Go¨del’s theorem,
e. g. by induction over cut-free infinite proofs (see [5]). This means that Go¨del’s
theorem is not needed to prove that the Paris-Harrington principle is independent
of PA (see [6] for an analogous argument with respect to Goodstein’s theorem). It
appears that no similar invariants are available on the level of Σ02-statements. The
only known proof of the fact that PA does not prove all instances of KΣ−1 appeals
to Go¨del’s theorem. In our opinion, this means that KΣ−1 is a conceptually different
and foundationally significant manifestation of mathematical independence.
3. Analyzing the computational strength
In this section we give a detailed proof of the claim that KΣ−1 does not increase
the computational strength of PA. As preparation, we need to show that all in-
stances of KΣ−1 are true. In the following remark we argue in a strong meta theory;
this will later be superseded by a proof in PA+ T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) (see Proposition 7.2).
Remark 3.1. As a consequence of Kruskal’s theorem [27], the partial order (B,≤B)
does not contain any infinite bad sequence. We will use this fact to justify an
arbitrary instance
Kϕ ≡ ∃fina⊆B(∀s∈aϕ(s) ∧ ∀t∈B(ϕ(t)→ ∃s∈as ≤B t))
of the axiom scheme KΣ−1 . Aiming at a contradiction, assume that Kϕ is false.
By a bad ϕ-sequence we mean a bad sequence t0, t1, . . . ⊆ B such that ϕ(ti) holds
for each i. Note that the empty sequence is a bad ϕ-sequence. Furthermore, each
bad ϕ-sequence t0, . . . , tn−1 can be extended into a bad ϕ-sequence t0, . . . , tn−1, tn.
To see that this is the case, consider a := {t0, . . . , tn−1}. As ∀s∈aϕ(s) holds, the
assumption that Kϕ is false yields an element tn ∈ B with ϕ(tn) and ∀s∈as 6≤B tn.
The latter ensures that t0, . . . , tn−1, tn is still bad. By dependent choice we now
get an infinite bad ϕ-sequence, which contradicts Kruskal’s theorem.
As explained in the introduction, the following is due to the general fact that
KΣ−1 consists of true Σ
0
2-sentences. The argument is folklore, but we provide details
in order to make the paper as accessible as possible.
Proposition 3.2. The provably total functions of PA+KΣ−1 and of PA coincide.
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Proof. Consider a provably total function f : N → N of PA + KΣ−1 . For some
Σ01-definition θ(x, y) of the graph of f , there are Σ
0
1-formulas ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1 (each
with a single free variable) such that we have
PA+ {Kϕi | i < n} ⊢ ∀x∃!yθ(x, y).
To show that f is a provably total function of PA, we will define the graph of f by
a modified Σ01-formula θ
′(x, y) such that PA alone proves ∀x∃!yθ(x, y)
′. For this
purpose we observe that the conjunction Kϕ0 ∧ · · · ∧ Kϕn−1 is equivalent to a true
Σ02-sentence ∃mψ(m). Pick a number n ∈ N such that the Π
0
1-sentence ψ(n) is true.
Then write
∃zθ0(x, y, z) ≡ ψ(n)→ θ(x, y)
for a ∆00-formula θ0. Since ψ(n) is true and implies each instance Kϕi, we do have
f(k) = m ⇔ N  ∃zθ0(k,m, z),
PA ⊢ ∀x∃y∃zθ0(x, y, z).
However, if PA does not prove ψ(n), then it will not prove that the value y is unique.
It is well known that one can restore uniqueness by minimizing over the code of the
pair 〈y, z〉. Note that minimizing over y alone would lead out of the Σ01-formulas:
the minimal y that satisfies ∃zθ0(x, y, z) is specified by a ∆
0
2-formula. To provide
details we write w = 〈y, z〉 for a ∆01-definition of Cantor’s pairing function; recall
that w = 〈y, z〉 implies y, z ≤ w. Let θ′(x, y) be the Σ01-formula
∃w(∃z≤w(w = 〈y, z〉 ∧ θ0(x, y, z)) ∧ ∀w′<w∀y′,z′≤w′(w
′ = 〈y′, z′〉 → ¬θ0(x, y
′, z′))).
It is straightforward to see that θ′ defines f and that PA proves ∀x∃!yθ
′(x, y). 
4. From the finite basis property to transfinite induction
In this section we show that PA+KΣ−1 proves each instance of T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ). As
we will see, it follows that PA + KΣ−1 is a proper extension of PA. The result of
this section is a relatively straightforward consequence of the existing literature. We
provide details in order to demonstrate that the argument works out with respect
to formula complexity and the role of parameters.
Let us first recall the usual notation system for ordinals below ε0. According to
Cantor’s normal form theorem, any ordinal α can be uniquely written as
α = ωα0 + · · ·+ ωαn−1 with α  α0  · · ·  αn−1,
where α = 0 arises from n = 0. For α ≺ ε0 = min{γ |ω
γ = γ} we have α0 ≺ α.
Recursively, this yields finite terms that represent all ordinals below ε0. Working
in PA, one can develop basic ordinal arithmetic in terms of the resulting notation
system (see e. g. [31, 41]). In the following we always refer to term representations
rather than actual ordinals.
In the introduction we have defined a set B of binary trees and an embeddability
relation ≤B. To establish a connection with the ordinals below ε0, it is convenient
to have a binary normal form: If α ≻ 0 has Cantor normal form as above, we write
α =NF ω
β + γ for β = α0 and γ = ω
α1 + · · ·+ ωαn−1 .
Note that β and γ can be seen as proper subterms of α. The following construction
is well-known (cf. [44, § 12]).
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Definition 4.1 (PA). We construct a function f : ε0 → B by setting
f(α) =
{
◦ if α = 0,
◦(f(β), f(γ)) if α =NF ω
β + γ,
which amounts to a recursion over term representations of ordinals.
Concerning the formalization in PA, we note that f is primitive recursive. Hence
f is PA-provably total. In particular, the graph of f is ∆01-definable in PA. The
following folklore result shows that f satisfies the definition of a quasi embedding.
Lemma 4.2 (PA). For α, β ≺ ε0, the inequality f(α) ≤B f(β) implies α  β.
Proof. Define a height function h : ε0 → N by recursion over terms, setting
h(α) =
{
0 if α = 0,
max{h(γ), h(δ)}+ 1 if α =NF ω
γ + δ.
The claim from the lemma can now be verified by induction over h(β). For α = 0
the implication holds because α  β is true. In the remaining case we may write
α =NF ω
γ+δ. By the definition of ≤B, the inequality f(α) = ◦(f(γ), f(δ)) ≤B f(β)
fails for f(β) = ◦. Hence we may also assume β ≻ 0, say β =NF ω
γ′ + δ′. Again by
the definition of ≤B, the inequality
f(α) = ◦(f(γ), f(δ)) ≤B ◦(f(γ
′), f(δ′)) = f(β)
can hold for two reasons: First assume we have f(γ) ≤B f(γ
′) and f(δ) ≤B f(δ
′).
In view of h(γ′), h(δ′) < h(β), the induction hypothesis yields γ  γ′ and δ  δ′.
By basic ordinal arithmetic we get
α = ωγ + δ  ωγ
′
+ δ′ = β.
Now assume f(α) ≤B f(β) holds because we have f(α) ≤B f(γ
′) or f(α) ≤B f(δ
′).
Inductively we get α  γ′  ωγ
′
or α  δ′. Either way we have α  ωγ
′
+δ′ = β. 
In addition to the lemma itself, we will need the following standard consequence:
Corollary 4.3 (PA). The function f : ε0 → B is injective.
Proof. Consider α, β ≺ ε0 with f(α) = f(β). A straightforward induction over B
shows that ≤B is reflexive. Hence we have f(α) ≤B f(β) and f(β) ≤B f(α). By
the previous lemma this implies α  β and β  α. Since the order relation on the
ordinals is antisymmetric, we obtain α = β. 
We can now show that the finite basis property implies transfinite induction.
The converse implication will be established in Section 7.
Proposition 4.4. Each instance of T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) can be proved in PA+ KΣ
−
1 .
Proof. Working in PA + KΣ−1 , we establish T I(ε0, ψ) for a given Π
0
1-formula ψ
with a single free variable. For this purpose we consider the formula
ϕ(t) :≡ t ∈ B ∧ ∃α≺ε0(f(α) = t ∧ ¬ψ(α)),
where f : ε0 → B is the function from Definition 4.1. Since the graph of f is
∆01-definable in PA, we see that ϕ(t) is (provably equivalent to) a Σ
0
1-formula with
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the single free variable t. Hence we may use Kϕ to get (a code for) a finite set
a ⊆ B that satisfies
∀s∈aϕ(s) ∧ ∀t∈B(ϕ(t)→ ∃s∈as ≤B t).
First assume that a is empty. Then ∃s∈as ≤B t fails for all t ∈ B, so that the second
conjunct enforces ∀t∈B¬ϕ(t). Given α ≺ ε0, it is straightforward to see that ¬ϕ(t)
for t := f(α) ∈ B implies ψ(α). We thus have ∀α≺ε0ψ(α), which is the conclusion
of T I(ε0, ψ). Now assume that the finite set a ⊆ B is non-empty. Due to ∀s∈aϕ(s),
we see that a is contained in the range of f . Also recall that f is injective. By
induction on the cardinality of a, one can infer that there is an ordinal γ ≺ ε0 with
f(γ) ∈ a ∧ ∀δ≺γf(δ) /∈ a.
Given an ordinal γ with this property, we now establish
∀β≺γψ(β) ∧ ¬ψ(γ),
which implies that T I(ε0, ψ) holds because its antecedent fails. Aiming at the first
conjunct, we consider an ordinal β ≺ γ. If ψ(β) was false, then ϕ(t) would hold
for t := f(β) ∈ B. Since a ⊆ B witnesses the conclusion of Kϕ, we would get
an element s ∈ a with s ≤B t. Writing s = f(δ) with δ ≺ ε0, we could invoke
Lemma 4.2 to conclude δ  β ≺ γ. By the above this would imply s = f(δ) /∈ a,
which yields the desired contradiction. To establish the second conjunct we observe
that f(γ) ∈ a implies ϕ(f(γ)). According to the definition of ϕ, this means that
there is an ordinal α ≺ ε0 with f(α) = f(γ) and ¬ψ(α). Since f is injective we get
α = γ and thus ¬ψ(γ), as required. 
According to Gentzen’s ordinal analysis [16], the consistency of Peano arithmetic
is provable in PA+ T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ). A detailed proof of a stronger result can be found
in the next section. Together with Proposition 4.4 and Go¨del’s theorem, it follows
that PA+KΣ−1 is a proper extension of PA.
5. From transfinite induction to reflection
Working over PA, we show that T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) implies RfnPA(Σ
0
2). The converse
direction will be established in Section 7. The result is rather similar to one by
Kreisel and Le´vy [26], who show that induction with parameters corresponds to uni-
form reflection. The author has found no reference for the parameter-free case. As
we will see, the connection with reflection implies that PA+KΣ−1 is not contained
in any consistent extension of PA by a computably enumerable set of Π02-sentences.
As preparation, we review the ordinal analysis of Peano arithmetic and its form-
alization in PA itself. First note that we cannot formalize the usual soundness
argument by induction over formal proofs, since there is no arithmetical truth
definition that would cover all relevant formulas (due to Tarski [45]). Even when
we restrict attention to theorems of restricted complexity, their proofs may involve
detours through more complex lemmata. The method of cut elimination aims to
remove such detours in order to permit a soundness argument that is based on
partial truth definitions (cf. [18, Section I.1(d)]). However, it is not immediately
possible to eliminate complex lemmata from proofs in Peano arithmetic, which may
use complex instances of induction in an essential way. To resolve this problem,
ordinal analysis transforms the usual finite proofs into infinite proof trees: In the
realm of infinite proofs, induction can be deduced from axioms of low complexity, so
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that cut elimination becomes possible. Soundness can then be proved by transfinite
induction over the rank of infinite proof trees.
Our ordinal analysis works with proofs in a Tait-style sequence calculus. In
particular, this means that all formulas are in negation normal form, and that
negation is a defined operation based on Morgan’s laws. Each node in a proof tree
deduces a sequent, i. e. a finite set Γ = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1} of formulas. The latter is to
be interpreted as the disjunction
∨
Γ = ϕ0 ∨ · · · ∨ϕn−1. In the context of sequents
we write Γ, ϕ for Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Detours in proofs are implemented via the cut rule
Γ, ϕ Γ,¬ϕ ,
Γ
which has the following intuitive significance: In order to show
∨
Γ, it suffices to
• prove a lemma ϕ (more precisely, the left premise proves
∨
Γ ∨ ϕ) and to
• prove that ϕ implies
∨
Γ (i. e. to prove
∨
Γ ∨ ¬ϕ, as in the right premise).
The crucial feature of the infinite proof system is the ω-rule
Γ, ϕ(0) Γ, ϕ(1) · · · ,
Γ, ∀nϕ(n)
which allows to infer ∀nϕ(n) if there is a proof of ϕ(n) for each numeral n. Induction
can be derived from the ω-rule, since
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀m(ϕ(m)→ ϕ(m+ 1))→ ϕ(n)
has a straightforward proof for each number n. It follows that any finite proof in
Peano arithmetic can be translated (or “embedded”) into the infinite system.
It is not immediately clear how infinite proof trees can be formalized in Peano
arithmetic. In the following we recall a very elegant approach due to Buchholz [4]
(see his paper for all missing details): The idea is to work with a set Z∗ of finite
terms. Each term names an infinite proof by specifying its role in the cut elimination
process. Specifically, each finite proof d in Peano arithmetic gives rise to a constant
symbol [d] ∈ Z∗, which denotes the translation of d into the infinite system. For
each term h ∈ Z∗ there is a term Eh ∈ Z∗ that names the proof that results from h
by a single application of cut elimination. The intermediate steps of cut elimination
give rise to auxiliary function symbols. By primitive recursion over terms one can
define an ordinal o(h) ≺ ε0 that bounds the rank of the proof tree represented
by h; for example, the well-known fact that cut elimination leads to an exponential
increase of the ordinal rank suggests the recursive clause o(Eh) = ωo(h). Also by
recursion over terms, one can determine the end sequent e(h), the last rule r(h),
the cut rank d(h), and terms s(h, n) ∈ Z∗ that denote the immediate subtrees of
the proof tree that is represented by h. Working in PA (or even in PRA), one
can show that the term system Z∗ is “locally correct” (see [4, Theorem 3.8]); in
particular this means that we have o(s(h, n)) ≺ o(s), except when r(s) signifies an
axiom. To ensure “global correctness”, one needs transfinite induction up to ε0,
which is not available in PA. In the sequel we abbreviate
h ⊢α0 Γ :⇔ h ∈ Z
∗ ∧ o(h) = α ∧ d(h) = 0 ∧ e(h) ⊆ Γ.
Intuitively, this asserts that h is a cut-free infinite proof tree with rank α and end
sequent Γ (note that
∨
e(h) implies
∨
Γ). Crucially, the relation h ⊢α0 Γ is primitive
recursive and hence ∆01-definable in PA. This implies that
Z∗ ⊢α0 Γ :⇔ ∃h∈Z∗h ⊢
α
0 Γ
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is a Σ01-formula with parameters α and Γ. We can now show the promised result:
Proposition 5.1. Each instance of RfnPA(Σ
0
2) can be proved in PA+T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ).
Proof. Consider a closed Σ02-formula ϕ. Working in PA + T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ), we assume
that we have PrPA(ϕ). In order to establish RfnPA(ϕ), we need to derive ϕ. We use
Buchholz’ formalization of ordinal analysis, as discussed above. By embedding and
cut elimination (cf. [4, Definitions 3.4 and 3.7]), the assumption PrPA(ϕ) implies
∃α≺ε0Z
∗ ⊢α0 {ϕ}.
Write Γ ⊆ {ϕ} ∪ Π−1 to express that Γ is a sequent that consists of Π
0
1-sentences
and (possibly) the formula ϕ. The statement that Γ contains a true Π01-sentence
can be expressed by a Π01-formula TrΠ−
1
(Γ) (cf. [18, Theorem I.1.75]). Aiming at a
contradiction, we assume that ϕ is false. Under this assumption we will derive
∀α≺ε0∀Γ(Γ ⊆ {ϕ} ∪Π
−
1 ∧ Z
∗ ⊢α0 Γ→ TrΠ−
1
(Γ)),
arguing by transfinite induction on α ≺ ε0. Note that the sentence ϕ is represented
by a fixed numeral. Hence α is the only free variable of the induction formula, and
the induction is covered by the scheme T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ). Once the induction is carried
out, it is starightforward to derive the desired contradiction: By the above we have
Z∗ ⊢α0 {ϕ} for some α ≺ ε0. However, we cannot have TrΠ−
1
({ϕ}), since ϕ was
assumed to be false (note that this covers both ϕ ∈ Π01 ⊆ Σ
0
2 and ϕ ∈ Σ
0
2\Π
0
1). It
remains to carry out the induction. In the step we consider a sequent Γ ⊆ {ϕ}∪Π−1
and assume h ⊢α0 Γ for some h ∈ Z
∗. We distinguish cases according to the last
rule r(h). Note that this cannot be a cut, since h ⊢α0 Γ entails d(h) = 0. If r(h)
is an axiom, then e(h) ⊆ Γ contains a true literal (cf. [4, Definition 2.2]). To
complete the proof, we consider the introduction of a quantifier; the introduction
of a propositional connective is similar and simpler. First assume that h ends with
an ω-rule, which introduces a formula ∀nθ(n) ∈ Γ. Due to Γ ⊆ {ϕ} ∪ Π
−
1 we see
that ∀nθ(n) must be a Π
0
1-sentence. Local correctness (see [4, Theorem 3.8]) yields
Z∗ ⊢
o(s(h,n))
0 Γ, θ(n) with o(s(h, n)) ≺ o(h) = α
for all n ∈ N. The induction hypothesis implies that each sequent Γ, θ(n) contains a
true Π01-sentence. Hence we get such a sentence in Γ, or all instances θ(n) are true.
In the latter case, it follows that Γ contains the true Π01-sentence ∀nθ(n). Finally,
assume that r(h) introduces an existential formula ∃nψ(n). In view of Γ ⊆ {ϕ}∪Π
−
1
we must have ∃nψ(n) ≡ ϕ (note that [4] does not work with bounded quantifiers
but treats primitive recursive relations as atomic). By local correctness there is
some existential witness k ∈ N such that we have
Z∗ ⊢
o(s(h,0))
0 Γ, ψ(k) with o(s(h, 0)) ≺ o(h) = α.
The induction hypothesis yields a true Π01-sentence in Γ, ψ(k). To establish TrΠ−
1
(Γ)
it suffices to show that ψ(k) cannot be true: if it was, then ϕ ≡ ∃nψ(n) would be
true as well, which contradicts our assumption. 
The following proof is similar to one by Kreisel and Le´vy [26, § 8] (see [1,
Lemma 2] for an argument that takes the formula complexity into account).
Corollary 5.2. There is no computably enumerable set Ψ of Π02-sentences such
that PA + Ψ is consistent and contains PA + KΣ−1 . In particular, the latter is a
proper extension of PA.
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Proof. Consider a computably enumerable set Ψ of Π02-sentences such that PA+Ψ
proves each instance of KΣ−1 . We need to show that PA + Ψ is inconsistent.
According to [28, Theorem 4], there is a single Π02-sentence ψ such that PA + ψ
is a Σ02-conservative extension of PA + Ψ. In view of conservativity, it suffices to
show that PA+ ψ is inconsistent. By Propositions 4.4 and 5.1 we have
PA+RfnPA(Σ
0
2) ⊆ PA+ T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) ⊆ PA+KΣ
−
1 ⊆ PA+Ψ ⊆ PA+ ψ.
Hence we can invoke local Σ02-reflection to get
PA+ ψ ⊢ PrPA(¬ψ)→ ¬ψ.
The contrapositive yields PA+ ψ ⊢ ¬PrPA(¬ψ). This means that PA+ ψ proves
its own consistency, so that it is inconsistent by Go¨del’s theorem. 
Since any true Σ02-sentence follows from a true Π
0
1-sentence, there is a set Ξ of
Π01-sentences such that PA+Ξ is consistent and contains PA+KΣ
−
1 . The corollary
tells us that Ξ cannot be computably enumerable.
6. A primitive recursive reification
In the rest of this paper we complete the proof that KΣ−1 , T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) and
RfnPA(Σ
0
2) are equivalent over PA. The present section is concerned with a tech-
nical result that will be crucial for this purpose.
Write Bad(B) for the set of non-empty finite bad sequences in B. We want to
construct a primitive recursive function r : Bad(B)→ ε0 such that we have
r(〈t0, . . . , tn, tn+1〉) ≺ r(〈t0, . . . , tn〉)
whenever 〈t0, . . . , tn+1〉 is an element of Bad(B), provably in PA. Such a function
is called a reification. It ensures that B is a well partial order with maximal order
type at most (and in fact equal to) ε0.
As mentioned in the introduction, the result that B has maximal order type ε0 is
due to de Jongh and Schmidt. Experience shows that maximal order types can be
witnessed by effective reifications. For the case of finite (and in particular binary)
trees this has been established by M. Rathjen and A. Weiermann [32, Section 2].
Unfortunately, we cannot simply cite their result: In [32] it is shown that ACA0
proves the existence of a reification; however, it is not entirely trivial to see that
the constructed reification is (primitive) recursive. In the rest of this section we
verify this fact in detail. Some readers may prefer to skip this verification and to
continue with the applications in the next section. We point out that the following
presentation is influenced by the more general construction in [19].
The reification of B will depend on reifications of various other orders. In the
context of first order arithmetic it helps to think of these orders as types, which are
represented by finite expressions.
Definition 6.1 (PA). The following recursive clauses generate a collection of types
and a subcollection of indecomposable types:
(i) The symbols B and E are indecomposable types.
(ii) If A,B are types, then A+B is a type.
(iii) If A,B are indecomposable types, then A×B is an indecomposable type.
(iv) If A is any type, then A∗ is an indecomposable type.
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Note that it is not allowed to form types such as (A + B) × C, since A + B is
not indecomposable. This will become important in the proof of Proposition 6.12.
The elements of our orders are represented by terms of the corresponding types.
To obtain primitive recursive constructions, it is crucial to work with terms of all
types simultaneously. For example, it is neither possible nor necessary to construct
all terms of type A before one constructs a term of type A∗. We do not specify
terms of type E, because the latter is supposed to represent the empty order.
Definition 6.2 (PA). The following recursive clauses generate a collection of
terms. We simultaneously specify the types of these terms:
(i) Each binary tree t ∈ B is a term of type B.
(ii) If a is a term of type A and B is a type, then ιB0 a is a term of type A+B.
If b is a term of type B and A is a type, then ιA1 b is a term of type A+B.
(iii) If a and b are terms of types A and B, then 〈a, b〉 is a term of type A×B.
(iv) If a0, . . . , an−1 have type A, then 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉A is a term of type A
∗.
Note that (iii) does only apply when A and B are indecomposable.
One readily constructs a Go¨del numbering # with the monotonicity properties
#s,#t < #◦(s, t) for s, t ∈ B, #a < #ιB0 a, #b < #ι
A
1 b,
#a,#b < #〈a, b〉, #a0,#〈a1, . . . , an〉A < #〈a0, . . . , an〉A.
We will use this Go¨del numbering to construct primitive recursive functions by
course-of-values recursion. Binary functions can be constructed with the help of
the Cantor pairing function, which is monotone in both components. For example,
the following definition decides a ≤A a
′ by recursion over the code of 〈#a,#a′〉.
Definition 6.3 (PA). The relation a ≤A a
′ between terms a and a′ of the same
type A is generated by the following recursive clauses (i. e. it is the smallest relation
that satisfies them):
(i) If s ≤B t, then s ≤B t.
(ii) If a ≤A a
′, then ιB0 a ≤A+B ι
B
0 a
′. If b ≤B b
′, then ιA1 b ≤A+B ι
A
1 b
′.
(iii) If a ≤A a
′ and b ≤B b
′, then 〈a, b〉 ≤A×B 〈a
′, b′〉.
(iv) If there is a strictly increasing f : {0, . . . ,m−1} → {0, . . . , n−1} such that
ai ≤A a
′
f(i) holds for all i < m, then 〈a0, . . . , am−1〉A ≤A∗ 〈a
′
0, . . . , a
′
n−1〉A.
Let us record the expected property:
Lemma 6.4 (PA). Each relation ≤A is a partial order on the terms of type A.
Proof. First check a ≤A a by induction over #a, simultaneously for all types A.
Then use induction over #a+#a′ to verify that a ≤A a
′ and a′ ≤A a imply a = a
′.
Finally, show a ≤A a
′& a′ ≤A a
′′ ⇒ a ≤A a
′′ by induction over #a+#a′+#a′′. 
From now on we write a ∈ A to express that a is a term of type A. Despite
this notation, one should keep in mind that A is a finite expression rather than an
infinite set. The following provides a substitute for the “missing” types A×B.
Definition 6.5 (PA). For arbitrary types A and B we recursively define a type
A⊗B and terms [a, b] ∈ A⊗B for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B: First put
A⊗B = A×B and [a, b] = 〈a, b〉 when A,B are indecomposable.
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Now consider A = C+D and an arbitrary B. To save parentheses, we assume that
⊗ binds stronger than +. We then define
(C +D)⊗B = C ⊗B +D ⊗B and [ιD0 c, b] = ι
D⊗B
0 [c, b], [ι
C
1 d, b] = ι
C⊗B
1 [d, b].
For indecomposable A and B = C +D we set
A⊗ (C +D) = A⊗ C +A⊗D and [a, ιD0 c] = ι
A⊗D
0 [a, c], [a, ι
C
1 d] = ι
A⊗C
1 [a, d].
The following is readily checked by induction on #a+#a′ +#b+#b′.
Lemma 6.6 (PA). We have
[a, b] ≤A⊗B [a
′, b′] ⇔ a ≤A a
′ and b ≤B b
′
for arbitrary terms a, a′ ∈ A and b, b′ ∈ B.
For a ∈ A we will abbreviate
a′ ∈ Aa :⇔ a
′ ∈ A and a 6≤A a
′.
The sets Aa are important for the analysis of maximal order types, because they
contain all elements that can follow a in a bad sequence. In our setting it will be
important to have a quasi embedding of Aa into a suitable type A(a). To save
parentheses we agree on A ⊗ B ⊗ C = (A ⊗ B) ⊗ C and [a, b, c] = [[a, b], c]. The
following construction is similar to the one in [19, Definition 5.3 and Example 5.4].
Definition 6.7 (PA). By recursion over #a we define a type A(a) for each a ∈ A:
(i) We have B(◦) = E and B(◦(s, t)) = (B(s) +B(t))∗.
(ii) We have (A+B)(ιB0 a) = A(a) +B and (A+B)(ι
A
1 b) = A+B(b).
(iii) We have (A×B)(〈a, b〉) = A(a) ⊗B +A⊗B(b).
(iv) We have A∗(〈〉A) = E and
A∗(〈a0, . . . , an〉A) = A(a0)
∗ +A(a0)
∗ ⊗A⊗A∗(〈a1, . . . , an〉A).
As promised, we get the following quasi embeddings:
Proposition 6.8. There is a primitive recursive function e such that PA proves the
following: For any type A and terms a ∈ A, b ∈ Aa we have eA(a, b) = e(a, b) ∈ A(a)
(note that A can be inferred from a). Furthermore we have
eA(a, b) ≤A(a) eA(a, b
′) ⇒ b ≤A b
′
for any terms b, b′ ∈ Aa.
Proof. The value eA(a, b) is defined by recursion over the code of the pair 〈#a,#b〉,
simultaneously for all types A. Once the construction of e is complete, the second
part of the proposition can be verified by induction on #a + #b + #b′. In the
following we distinguish cases according to the form of a.
First consider a = ◦ ∈ B = A. Since ◦ ≤B t is true for any t ∈ B, the set Aa is
empty and there are no values to define. Now assume a = ◦(s0, s1) ∈ B = A. For
the term b = ◦ ∈ B we put
eB(◦(s0, s1), ◦) = 〈〉B(s0)+B(s1) ∈ (B(s0) +B(s1))
∗ = B(◦(s0, s1)).
Now assume that we have b = ◦(t0, t1) ∈ B. The condition b ∈ Aa amounts to
◦(s0, s1) 6≤B ◦(t0, t1), which yields s0 6≤B t0 or s1 6≤B t1. Let us assume that we
have s0 6≤B t0, which amounts to t0 ∈ Bs0 . We may then refer to the recursively
defined value
eB(s0, t0) ∈ B(s0).
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More formally, the recursive definition of eA(a, b) and the inductive verification of
eA(a, b) ∈ A(a) should be separated. In order to do so, we can agree on a default
value for the hypothetical case that the decidable property eB(s0, t0) ∈ B(s0) fails;
the induction shows that the default value is never called. By ◦(s0, s1) 6≤B ◦(t0, t1)
we also have ◦(s0, s1) 6≤B t1, which amounts to t1 ∈ B◦(s0,s1) and provides
eB(◦(s0, s1), t1) ∈ B(◦(s0, s1)) = (B(s0) +B(s1))
∗.
Let us agree to write c0 ⋆ 〈c1, . . . , cn〉C := 〈c0, c1, . . . , cn〉C ∈ C
∗ for terms c0, . . . , cn
of a type C. We can now state our recursive clause as
eB(◦(s0, s1), ◦(t0, t1)) =


ι
B(s1)
0 eB(s0, t0) ⋆ eB(◦(s0, s1), t1) if s0 6≤B t0,
ι
B(s0)
1 eB(s1, t1) ⋆ eB(◦(s0, s1), t0) otherwise.
To explain the second case we recall that s1 6≤B t1 must hold if s0 6≤B t0 fails.
Before we state the other recursive clauses, let us verify that the second part of
the proposition holds for A = B. As above we write a = ◦(s0, s1). In the case of
the term b′ = ◦ we observe
eB(a, b) ≤B(s) eB(a, b) = 〈〉B(s0)+B(s1) ⇒ eB(a, b) = 〈〉B(s0)+B(s1).
The consequent of this implication can only hold for b = ◦. In this case b ≤B b
′ is
satisfied for any b′ ∈ B. Hence it remains to consider terms of the form b = ◦(t0, t1)
and b′ = ◦(t′0, t
′
1). In general we have
c ⋆ σ ≤C∗ c
′ ⋆ σ′ ⇔ c ⋆ σ ≤C∗ σ
′ or (c ≤C c
′ and σ ≤C∗ σ
′).
First assume that eB(s, b) ≤B(s) eB(s, b
′) holds because of eB(s, b) ≤B(s) eB(s, t
′
i).
Then the induction hypothesis yields b ≤B t
′
i, which implies b ≤B ◦(t
′
0, t
′
1) = b
′.
Now assume we have eB(s, b) ≤B(s) eB(s, b
′) because there are i, j ∈ {0, 1} with
ι
B(s1−i)
i eB(si, ti) ≤B(s0)+B(s1) ι
B(s1−j)
j eB(sj , t
′
j),
eB(s, t1−i) ≤B(s) eB(s, t
′
1−j).
The first inequality can only hold for i = j. It yields eB(si, ti) ≤B(si) eB(si, t
′
i),
which implies ti ≤B t
′
i by induction hypothesis. From the second inequality we can
infer t1−i ≤B t
′
1−i. Together we get b = ◦(t0, t1) ≤B ◦(t
′
0, t
′
1) = b
′, as desired.
Sum and product types are considerably easier to handle. We only state the
recursive clauses and leave all verifications to the reader:
eA+B(ι
B
0 a, ι
B
0 a
′) = ιB0 eA(a, a
′), eA+B(ι
B
0 a, ι
A
1 b
′) = ι
A(a)
1 b
′,
eA+B(ι
A
1 b, ι
B
0 a
′) = ι
B(b)
0 a
′, eA+B(ι
A
1 b, ι
A
1 b
′) = ιA1 eB(b, b
′).
eA×B(〈a, b〉, 〈a
′, b′〉) =


ι
A⊗B(b)
0 [eA(a, a
′), b′] if a 6≤A a
′,
ι
A(a)⊗B
1 [a
′, eB(b, b
′)] otherwise.
Finally, we consider the case of a type A∗. For a = 〈〉A ∈ A
∗ it suffices to observe
that (A∗)a is empty, since 〈〉A ≤A∗ τ holds for any τ ∈ A
∗. Now consider a term
of the form a = a0 ⋆ σ ∈ A
∗. We write b = 〈b0, . . . , bn−1〉A ∈ (A
∗)a and distinguish
two cases. If we have a0 6≤A bi for all i < n, then we set
eA∗(a, b) = ι
A(a0)
∗⊗A⊗A∗(σ)
0 〈eA(a0, b0), . . . , eA(a0, bn−1)〉A(a0).
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Note that this is an element of A(a0)
∗ +A(a0)
∗ ⊗A⊗A∗(σ) = A∗(a), as required.
Otherwise we fix the smallest number i < n with a0 ≤A bi. In view of b ∈ (A
∗)a
we must have σ 6≤A∗ 〈bi+1, . . . , bn−1〉A. We can thus define eA∗(a, b) as
ι
A(a0)
∗
1 [〈eA(a0, b0), . . . , eA(a0, bi−1)〉A(a0), bi, eA∗(σ, 〈bi+1, . . . , bn−1〉A)].
Using the induction hypothesis, one readily checks that eA∗(a, b) ≤A∗(a) eA∗(a, b
′)
implies b ≤A∗ b
′. 
Our next aim is to iterate the previous construction along bad sequences. Given
a type A, we write σ ∈ Bad+(A) to express that σ is a finite bad sequence in A.
This means that we have σ = 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 for terms a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ A that satisfy
ai 6≤A aj for all i < j < n. If we have σ ∈ Bad
+(A) and σ is different from the
empty sequence 〈〉, then we write σ ∈ Bad(A). For σ = 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 ∈ Bad
+(A)
we abbreviate σ⌢a = 〈a0, . . . , an−1, a〉 and put
a ∈ Aσ :⇔ a ∈ A and σ
⌢a ∈ Bad(A).
The expressions A(a) and eA(a, b) have only been explained for a ∈ A and b ∈ Aa.
We will see that the following definition does conform with these restrictions. In
order to state the definition it is, nevertheless, helpful to realize that the primitive
recursive functions (A, a) 7→ A(a) and (A, a, b) 7→ eA(a, b) can be extended to
arbitrary arguments.
Definition 6.9 (PA). Consider a type A. For a sequence σ ∈ Bad+(A) and a
term b ∈ Aσ we define A[σ] and eˆA(σ, b) by the recursive clauses
A[〈〉] = A, A[σ⌢a] = A[σ](eˆA(σ, a)),
eˆA(〈〉, b) = b, eˆA(σ
⌢a, b) = eA[σ](eˆA(σ, a), eˆA(σ, b)).
In order to justify the recursion in detail, we consider σ = 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 and
write σ ↾ i = 〈a0, . . . , ai−1〉. Then A[σ ↾ i] and the values eˆA(σ ↾ i, aj) for i ≤ j < n
are constructed simultaneously by recursion on i < n. For σ′ := σ⌢an with an := b
this also explains the value eˆA(σ, b) = eˆA(σ
′ ↾n, an).
Corollary 6.10 (PA). If σ is a finite bad sequence in the type A, then A[σ] is a
type. For any b ∈ Aσ the value eˆA(σ, b) is a term of this type. Furthermore we have
eˆA(σ, b) ≤A[σ] eˆA(σ, b
′) ⇒ b ≤A b
′
for any terms b, b′ ∈ Aσ.
Proof. We use induction on σ to verify all claims simultaneously. The case of σ = 〈〉
is immediate. Now assume that we have σ = σ0
⌢a. The induction hypothesis tells
us that eˆA(σ0, a) is a term of type A[σ0]. In view of Definition 6.7 it follows
that A[σ] = A[σ0](eˆA(σ0, a)) is a type. For b ∈ Aσ we have a 6≤A b, so that the
induction hypothesis yields eˆA(σ0, a) 6≤A[σ0] eˆA(σ0, b). By Proposition 6.8 we get
eˆA(σ, b) = eA[σ0](eˆA(σ0, a), eˆA(σ0, b)) ∈ A[σ0](eˆA(σ0, a)) = A[σ].
From eˆA(σ, b) ≤A[σ] eˆA(σ, b
′) we can infer eˆA(σ0, b) ≤A[σ0] eˆA(σ0, b
′), also by Pro-
position 6.8. Then b ≤A b
′ follows by induction hypothesis. 
In order to obtain a reification, it remains to assign a suitable ordinal to each
type. Let us write α⊕β and α⊗β for the natural (“Hessenberg”) sum and product
of ordinals α, β ≺ ε0 (see e. g. [38, § 4]). In contrast to the usual operations of
ordinal arithmetic, the natural variants are commutative and strictly increasing
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in both arguments. Ordinals of the form ωγ are additively indecomposable, in the
sense that α, β ≺ ωγ implies α⊕β ≺ ωγ ; conversely, any additively indecomposable
ordinal δ 6= 0 has the form δ = ωγ . For α, β ≺ ωγ2 := ω
(ωγ) we have α⊗ β ≺ ωγ2 .
Definition 6.11 (PA). Let us say that a type is low if it does not involve the
constant symbol B. We recursively assign an ordinal o(A) to each low type A:
o(E) = 0, o(A+B) = o(A) ⊕ o(B),
o(A×B) = o(A)⊗ o(B), o(A∗) = ω
o(A)
2 .
The following is crucial for the construction of a reification.
Proposition 6.12 (PA). If A is a low type and a ∈ A is a term, then A(a) is a
low type and we have o(A(a)) ≺ o(A).
Proof. As preparation we note that A⊗B is low when the same holds for A and B.
A straightforward induction shows o(A ⊗ B) = o(A) ⊗ o(B); for example, the dis-
tributivity property from [38, Lemma 4.5(8)] accounts for the inductive verification
o((C +D)⊗B) = o(C ⊗B +D ⊗ B) = o(C ⊗B)⊕ o(D ⊗B) =
= (o(C) ⊗ o(B)) ⊕ (o(D)⊗ o(B)) = (o(C) ⊕ o(D)) ⊗ o(B) = o(C +D)⊗ o(B).
By induction on A one can show that o(A) is additively indecomposable when A
is an indecomposable type. The most interesting step concerns a type A = B ×C,
where B and C are indecomposable according to Definition 6.1. Inductively we
may write o(B) = ωβ and o(C) = ωγ (unless we have o(A) = 0). Then
o(B × C) = o(B) ⊗ o(C) = ωβ ⊗ ωγ = ωβ⊕γ
is an additively indecomposable ordinal as well. The claim of the proposition can
now be verified by induction over #a, for all types A simultaneously. First consider
the case of a term ιB0 a ∈ A+B. The induction hypothesis tells us that A(a) is low
with o(A(a)) ≺ o(A). Hence (A+B)(ιB0 a) = A(a) +B is low and we have
o((A+B)(ιB0 )) = o(A(a) +B) = o(A(a)) ⊕ o(B) ≺ o(A) ⊕ o(B) = o(A+B).
The case of ιA1 b ∈ A+B is analogous. Now consider a term 〈a, b〉 ∈ A×B. In view
of the above, the induction hypothesis implies that A(a)⊗B is low with ordinal
o(A(a)⊗B) = o(A(a)) ⊗ o(B) ≺ o(A) ⊗ o(B) = o(A ×B).
In the same way we get o(A⊗B(b)) ≺ o(A×B). In view of Definition 6.1, a type of
the form A×B is always indecomposable. By the above this entails that o(A×B)
is an additively indecomposable ordinal. Hence we obtain
o((A×B)(〈a, b〉)) = o(A(a)⊗B+A⊗B(b)) = o(A(a)⊗B)⊕o(A⊗B(b)) ≺ o(A×B).
Finally, we consider the case of a type A∗. Concerning the term 〈〉A ∈ A
∗, we note
o(A∗(〈〉A)) = o(E) = 0 ≺ ω
o(A)
2 = o(A
∗).
Now consider a term a⋆σ ∈ A∗ (see the proof of Proposition 6.8 for the notation). In
view of #a,#σ < #a⋆σ the induction hypothesis yields o(A∗(σ)) ≺ o(A∗) = ω
o(A)
2
and o(A(a)) ≺ o(A). The latter implies o(A(a)∗) = ω
o(A(a))
2 ≺ ω
o(A)
2 . Since we are
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concerned with ordinals below ε0, we also have o(A) ≺ ω
o(A)
2 . Using the fact that
ω
o(A)
2 is additively and multiplicatively indecomposable, we can deduce
o(A∗(a ⋆ σ)) = o(A(a)∗ +A(a)∗ ⊗A⊗A∗(σ)) =
= o(A(a)∗)⊕ o(A(a)∗)⊗ o(A) ⊗ o(A∗(σ)) ≺ ω
o(A)
2 = o(A
∗),
as required. 
Recall that the terms of type B coincide with the finite binary trees, i. e. with
the element of B. Below we will show that the type B[σ] is low for any non-empty
bad sequence σ ∈ Bad(B) = Bad(B). To state the following definition, we simply
assume that the primitive recursive function o(·) is extended to arbitrary arguments.
Definition 6.13 (PA). For σ ∈ Bad(B) we put r(σ) := o(B[σ]).
Finally, we can deduce the promised result:
Corollary 6.14 (PA). The primitive recursive function r : Bad(B) → ε0 is a
reification, i. e. we have
r(〈t0, . . . , tn, tn+1〉) ≺ r(〈t0, . . . , tn〉)
for any bad sequence 〈t0, . . . , tn, tn+1〉 in B.
Proof. We use induction on σ ∈ Bad(B) to show that B[σ] is a low type. For this
purpose it is crucial to recall that the empty sequence was included in Bad+(B) but
excluded from Bad(B). Hence the base case concerns a sequence of the form σ = 〈t〉.
In view of Definition 6.9 we have
B[〈t〉] = B[〈〉](eˆB(〈〉, t)) = B(t).
Even though the type B is not low, a straightforward induction on t ∈ B shows
that B(t) is a low type. Now consider a sequence σ⌢t ∈ Bad(B) with σ 6= 〈〉. The
induction hypothesis ensures that B[σ] is a low type. According to Corollary 6.10
we have eˆB(σ, t) ∈ B[σ]. By (the easy part of) Proposition 6.12 we conclude that
B[σ⌢t] = B[σ](eˆB(σ, t))
is a low type as well. The more substantial part of Proposition 6.12 yields
r(σ⌢t) = o(B[σ⌢t]) ≺ o(B[σ]) = r(σ).
For σ = 〈t0, . . . , tn〉 and t = tn+1 this is the claim of the corollary. 
7. From reflection to the finite basis property
Working over PA, we show that RfnPA(Σ
0
2) entails T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ), which does in
turn entail KΣ−1 . This completes our proof that all three principles are equivalent.
Using Goryachev’s theorem, we can deduce a characterization of the Π01-sentences
that are provable in PA+KΣ−1 .
For the case of uniform reflection and induction with parameters, the following
has been shown by Kreisel and Le´vy [26].
Proposition 7.1. Each instance of T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) can be proved in PA+RfnPA(Σ
0
2).
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Proof. Consider a Π01-formula ψ(x) with a single free variable. Arguing in the
theory PA + RfnPA(Σ
0
2), we establish T I(ε0, ψ) by contraposition: Assume that
the conclusion of transfinite induction fails, so that we have ∃α≺ε0¬ψ(α). The latter
is a Σ01-formula, so that its truth can be established by an explicit verification. More
formally, we invoke formalized Σ01-completeness (cf. [18, Theorem I.1.8]) to obtain
∃α≺ε0 PrPA(¬ψ(α˙)).
This uses Feferman’s dot notation: By ψ(α˙) one denotes the closed object for-
mula that result from ψ(x) when we substitute x by the α-th numeral, where the
code α is considered as a natural number (cf. the notation in [18, Corollary I.1.76]).
Gentzen [17] has shown that PA proves induction up to each fixed ordinal below ε0.
This result can itself be formalized in Peano arithmetic (and in much weaker the-
ories, cf. [11, Section 3]), so that we get
∀α≺ε0 PrPA(∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β)→ ψ(γ))→ ψ(α˙)).
Together with the above this yields
PrPA(¬∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β)→ ψ(γ))).
By an instance of RfnPA(Σ
0
2) we get ¬∀γ≺ε0(∀β≺γψ(β)→ ψ(γ)), which is (provably
equivalent to) a closed Σ02-formula. Hence the premise of T I(ε0, ψ) fails, so that
our proof by contraposition is complete. 
The following is a consequence of the result that (B,≤B) is a well partial order
with maximal order type ε0, which is due to de Jongh (unpublished; cf. the intro-
duction to [34]) and Diana Schmidt (see [35, Theorem II.2] in combination with the
example after [35, Definition I.15]). A detailed proof in our setting has been given
in the previous section.
Proposition 7.2. Each instance of KΣ−1 can be proved in PA+TI(ε0,Π
−
1 ).
Proof. We fix an instance Kϕ (where ϕ is a Σ01-formula with a single free vari-
able) and work in PA +TI(ε0,Π
−
1 ). It is instructive to recall the argument from
Remark 3.1, which relies on a notion of ϕ-sequence. If {n ∈ N |ϕ(n)} is comput-
ably enumerable but not decidable, then it is not decidable whether a given finite
sequence is a ϕ-sequence. For this reason we now introduce a finer notion: Write
ϕ(x) ≡ ∃yθ(x, y) with a ∆
0
0-formula θ. As in the previous section we write Bad(B)
for the set of non-empty finite bad sequences in B. By a certified ϕ-sequence we
mean a finite sequence
(t0, c0), . . . , (tn, cn) ⊆ B × N
such that we have 〈t0, . . . , tn〉 ∈ Bad(B) and θ(ti, ci) for all i ≤ n. Note that
the latter implies ϕ(ti). Since θ contains no further free variables, the notion of
certified ϕ-sequence is defined by a ∆01-formula without parameters. By picking
the value f(n) with minimal code, one can thus define a (possibly partial) function
f : N→ B × N with the following property:
• If the sequence 〈f(0), . . . , f(n− 1)〉 is defined and can be extended into a
certified ϕ-sequence of length n+1, then 〈f(0), . . . , f(n)〉 is such a sequence.
Note that the relation f(x) = y is Σ01-definable without parameters. Aiming at a
contradiction, we now assume that the instance Kϕ is false. Then all values f(n) are
defined: Inductively, we may assume that f(m) = (tm, cm) is defined for all m < n;
in the case of n > 0, the construction of f ensures that 〈(t0, c0), . . . , (tn−1, cn−1)〉
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is a certified ϕ-sequence. To deduce that f(n) is defined as well, we consider the
set a := {t0, . . . , tn−1}. As Kϕ is false, we must have
¬∀s∈aϕ(s) ∨ ∃t∈B(ϕ(t) ∧ ∀s∈as 6≤B t).
For s = tm ∈ a, the construction of f ensures θ(tm, cm) and thus ϕ(s). Hence the
second disjunct yields an element tn ∈ B with ϕ(tn) and tm 6≤B tn for all m < n.
The latter implies 〈t0, . . . , tn〉 ∈ Bad(B). Due to ϕ(tn) we can pick a number cn
with θ(tn, cn). Then 〈f(0), . . . , f(n−1), (tn, cn)〉 is a certified ϕ-sequence, and f(n)
is defined as the smallest pair 〈tn, cn〉 for which this holds. We can now define a
total computable function g : N→ Bad(B) by setting
g(n) := 〈t0, . . . , tn〉 with f(m) = (tm, cm).
According to Corollary 6.14, there is a primitive recursive reification
r : Bad(B)→ ε0.
It follows that the total computable function r ◦ g : N → ε0 is strictly decreasing.
This is impossible in the presence of TI(ε0,Π
−
1 ). To be more precise, we note that
r ◦ g(n) = α is Σ01-definable without parameters. Using TI(ε0,Π
−
1 ) one can prove
∀α≺ε0∀n∀δ≺ε0(r ◦ g(n) = δ → α  δ).
To establish the induction step, it suffices to derive a contradiction from the as-
sumption that we have r ◦ g(n) ≺ α for some n ∈ N. Since r is a reification, the
latter would lead to r ◦ g(n + 1) ≺ r ◦ g(n) =: γ, which contradicts the induction
hypothesis for γ ≺ α. If we apply the result of the induction to α = r◦g(0)+1 ≺ ε0,
n = 0 and δ = r ◦ g(0), then we get r ◦ g(0) + 1  r ◦ g(0), which is impossible. 
Together with Propositions 4.4, 5.1 and 7.1 we obtain the following:
Theorem 7.3. We have
PA+KΣ−1 ≡ PA+ T I(ε0,Π
−
1 ) ≡ PA+RfnPA(Σ
0
2),
i. e. all three theories prove the same theorems.
Let Con(PA + ϕ) be a reasonable formalization of the statement that PA + ϕ
is consistent. We consider the recursively generated Π01-sentences
Con0(PA) :≡ 0 = 0,
Conn+1(PA) :≡ Con(PA+Conn(PA)).
Note that Con1(PA) is equivalent to the usual consistency statement. As mentioned
in the introduction, we obtain the following:
Corollary 7.4. We have
PA+KΣ−1 ≡Π0
1
PA+ {Conn(PA) |n ∈ N},
i. e. the two theories prove the same Π01-sentences.
Proof. Let us write RfnPA for the full local reflection principle, i. e. the collection of
all formulas PrPA(ϕ)→ ϕ, where ϕ can be any sentence in the language of first order
arithmetic. According to Goryachev’s theorem (see e. g. [29, Theorem IV.5]), any
Π01-theorem of PA+RfnPA can be proved in PA+{Conn(PA) |n ∈ N}. A fortiori,
this applies to all Π01-theorems of PA + RfnPA(Σ
0
2) ≡ PA + KΣ
−
1 . In the other
direction we have a full inclusion: The theory PA+RfnPA(Σ
0
2) proves all theorems
of PA + {Conn(PA) |n ∈ N}, because it proves each statement Conn(PA). For
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n = 0 this is trivial. To conclude by meta induction on n, it suffices to observe that
the formula Conn(PA)→ Conn+1(PA) is the contrapositive of
PrPA(¬Conn(PA))→ ¬Conn(PA),
which is an instance of RfnPA(Σ
0
2). 
Note that the corollary does not extend to arbitrary formula complexity: In
PA+{Conn(PA) |n ∈ N} one cannot prove all instances of KΣ
−
1 , by Corollary 5.2.
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